When does prior knowledge disproportionately benefit older adults' memory? by Badham, SP et al.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=nanc20
Download by: [Nottingham Trent University] Date: 20 April 2016, At: 01:38
Aging, Neuropsychology, and Cognition
A Journal on Normal and Dysfunctional Development
ISSN: 1382-5585 (Print) 1744-4128 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/nanc20
When does prior knowledge disproportionately
benefit older adults’ memory?
Stephen P. Badham, Mhairi Hay, Natasha Foxon, Kiran Kaur & Elizabeth A.
Maylor
To cite this article: Stephen P. Badham, Mhairi Hay, Natasha Foxon, Kiran Kaur & Elizabeth A.
Maylor (2016) When does prior knowledge disproportionately benefit older adults’ memory?,
Aging, Neuropsychology, and Cognition, 23:3, 338-365, DOI: 10.1080/13825585.2015.1099607
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13825585.2015.1099607
© 2015 The Author(s). Published by Taylor &
Francis.
Published online: 16 Oct 2015.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 367
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
When does prior knowledge disproportionately beneﬁt older
adults’ memory?
Stephen P. Badham, Mhairi Hay, Natasha Foxon, Kiran Kaur and Elizabeth A. Maylor
Department of Psychology, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
ABSTRACT
Material consistent with knowledge/experience is generally
more memorable than material inconsistent with knowledge/
experience – an eﬀect that can be more extreme in older
adults. Four experiments investigated knowledge eﬀects on
memory with young and older adults. Memory for familiar
and unfamiliar proverbs (Experiment 1) and for common and
uncommon scenes (Experiment 2) showed similar knowledge
eﬀects across age groups. Memory for person-consistent and
person-neutral actions (Experiment 3) showed a greater beneﬁt
of prior knowledge in older adults. For cued recall of related
and unrelated word pairs (Experiment 4), older adults bene-
ﬁted more from prior knowledge only when it provided
uniquely useful additional information beyond the episodic
association itself. The current data and literature suggest that
prior knowledge has the age-dissociable mnemonic properties
of (1) improving memory for the episodes themselves (age
invariant), and (2) providing conceptual information about
the tasks/stimuli extrinsically to the actual episodic memory
(particularly aiding older adults).
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Personal concerns related to memory decline are evident in healthy older adults
(Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000); memory decline is also one of the most salient aspects of
cognitive aging experimentally (Zacks, Hasher, & Li, 2000), impacting older adults’ lives
socially and culturally (Naveh-Benjamin & Ohta, 2012). Given that older adults have built
up an extensive body of knowledge across their lifespan (e.g., Verhaeghen, 2003), and
that they have largely intact access to that knowledge (e.g., Laver & Burke, 1993;
Umanath & Marsh, 2014), it is crucial to understand how older adults can utilize their
knowledge to improve memory.
An individual’s structured knowledge of the world can inﬂuence how information is
stored and retrieved from memory (Bartlett, 1932). Information consistent with prior
knowledge can be more memorable than information inconsistent with prior knowledge
across a wide variety of paradigms. For example, Bransford and Johnson (1972) demon-
strated that participants were better able to comprehend and remember passages of
text when they were able to link the content to their knowledge of the world. Chase and
Simon (1973) showed that expert chess players were better able to remember the
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positions of chess pieces on a chess board than were novice chess players. Other studies
have shown that individuals with particular expertise are better than less-knowledgeable
individuals at remembering text related to that expertise (e.g., Arbuckle, Vanderleck,
Harsany, & Lapidus, 1990; Miller, 2003). Additionally, novel material (material unsup-
ported by existing knowledge) is more diﬃcult to remember than familiar material:
words are easier to remember than nonwords and foreign words (e.g., Hulme, Maughan,
& Brown, 1991), images of faces are easier to remember than abstract crystal structures
and ink blots (Goldstein & Chance, 1970), and possible line drawings of objects are easier
to remember than impossible ones (Schacter, Cooper, & Valdiserri, 1992).
Many studies have shown that young and older adults have a diﬀerential reliance on
knowledge use in memory tasks (see Umanath & Marsh, 2014, for a review). Often, prior
knowledge has a larger beneﬁt to memory for older adults relative to young adults.
Castel (2005) found that age diﬀerences in memory for the prices of items were reduced
when those prices were realistic (knowledge-consistent) compared with when they were
unrealistic (knowledge-inconsistent). Hess (1985) tested young and older adults’ memory
for typical and atypical actions described in scripts. For example, in a script describing a
visit to a restaurant, a typical action was looking at the menu and an atypical action was
putting a pen in a pocket. Older adults had poorer memory overall, but the age deﬁcit
was smaller for typical than for atypical actions. Similarly, for actions in videos, Garcia-
Bajos, Migueles, and Aizpurua (2012) found that age and typicality interacted, with
signiﬁcant age deﬁcits in memory for low-typicality actions but not for high-typicality
actions. Naveh-Benjamin, Hussain, Guez, and Bar-On (2003) showed that age deﬁcits in
memory for word pairs were alleviated by semantic relations between the words
compared to unrelated word pairs. Badham, Estes, and Maylor (2012) extended this by
showing that this was the case even when the word pairings were novel (e.g., apart-
ment–dog, box–wine) so long as they could be integrated together within a context.
Similarly, Smith, Park, Earles, Shaw, and Whitinga (1998) found that age deﬁcits in
memory for associations between pictures were alleviated when the pictures were
related to one another compared with when they were unrelated to one another.
Umanath and Marsh (2014) argued that access to knowledge is largely preserved in
old age and this can diﬀerentially support older adults’ episodic memory (relative to
young adults’ memory) for information that is consistent with existing knowledge, or
diﬀerentially hinder older adults’ episodic memory for information that is inconsistent
with existing knowledge. Their review presented several theoretical perspectives on
these patterns of results in the literature, but crucially did not discuss age invariance
in the eﬀects of knowledge on memory tasks, which is a key focus of the current study.
The application of prior knowledge to memory tasks does not always beneﬁt older
adults more than young adults and there is suﬃcient evidence in the literature to
conclude that this is not due to Type II errors. For example, Arbuckle et al. (1990)
tested young and older music experts and nonmusic experts on their memory for
passages of text about music or about dogs. The music experts showed better
memory than the nonmusic experts for the music passages, but not for the dog
passages. Music expertise beneﬁted young and older adults to the same extent (a
result also found with cooking expertise by Miller, 2003). Morrow, Leirer, Carver, and
Tanke (1998) assessed memory for appointments in young and older adults where the
information was presented in an ordered (knowledge-consistent) or disordered
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(knowledge-inconsistent) sequence. Memory was improved to the same extent across
age groups when the information in the appointments was ordered compared to
disordered – a similar result was also found with the ordering of instructions related to
taking medication (Morrow, Leirer, Andrassy, Tanke, & Stine-Morrow, 1996). Similarly,
Cherry and Jones (1999) tested young and older adults’ memory for the positions of
dolls’-house furniture. In a high knowledge consistency condition, the furniture was
organized (e.g., all kitchen furniture together), whilst in a low knowledge consistency
condition the furniture was unorganized. The positions of organized furniture were
remembered better than the positions of unorganized furniture to the same extent in
the two age groups. Finally, Gutchess and Park (2009) tested memory for associations
between pictures of objects and their backgrounds. Consistent object–background
pairings (e.g., a cow in a farm) were remembered better than inconsistent object–
background pairings (e.g., a cow in a laundry room), but to the same extent by groups
of young and older participants.
The current study
Overall, the literature presents a mixed set of results with regard to age diﬀerences in
knowledge use during memory tasks. Some studies show that older adults’ memory is
more inﬂuenced by prior knowledge than young adults’ memory, whilst other studies
show age invariance in this eﬀect. It should be noted that to the present authors’
knowledge there are only two studies where prior knowledge has led to a greater eﬀect
on young adults’ memory than on older adults’ memory (Craik & Masani, 1967; Heron &
Craik, 1964). In these studies, meaningless information led to smaller age deﬁcits in
memory than meaningful information. As reviewed above, age diﬀerences in knowledge
use have been studied across a wide variety of memory paradigms. Much prior research
in this area has primarily focused on establishing whether older adults can show eﬀects
of knowledge application, and if so, whether these diﬀer from young adults. At this
stage, it is well accepted that prior knowledge can be useful to older adults in memory
tasks. Other studies have also demonstrated that older adults have good access to their
knowledge: older adults perform better than do young adults in vocabulary tests
(Verhaeghen, 2003), show good recall and recognition of general knowledge
(Botwinick & Storandt, 1980), and display intact priming (rapid activation of semantic
knowledge) (Laver & Burke, 1993). Importantly, what remains to be clariﬁed are the
circumstances under which older adults beneﬁt more from knowledge application than
young adults and the circumstances under which there is age invariance in the use of
knowledge to support memory. Dissociating these eﬀects will elucidate the eﬀects of
knowledge on processes related to cognitive aging.
Amongst the studies in the literature that do and do not show disproportionate
eﬀects of prior knowledge on older adults’ memory relative to young, there would
appear to be no consistent pattern as a variety of diﬀerent paradigms reveals both
types of age eﬀect. Our approach therefore began on an exploratory basis, combining
the notions of prior knowledge and environmental support. Linking memory stimuli to
prior knowledge has been seen as a method of providing environmental support
(Bäckman & Herlitz, 1990; Naveh-Benjamin, Craik, Guez, & Kreuger, 2005); Craik (1986)
argued that increasing environmental support reduces cognitive demands and therefore
340 S. P. BADHAM ET AL.
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reduces age deﬁcits in memory. It is therefore possible that clarifying age diﬀerences in
the use of prior knowledge may provide new insight into environmental support and
the role of cognitive demands in aging.
Across the ﬁrst three experiments, we manipulated prior knowledge in line with
the environmental support hypothesis, initially on an exploratory basis. This led to the
identiﬁcation of a potentially crucial factor that appeared to determine whether or
not older adults’ memory disproportionately beneﬁted from prior knowledge
application, which was then tested explicitly in Experiment 4. In brief, prior
knowledge was found to be particularly beneﬁcial to older adults’ memory when it
provided extra (speciﬁc) guidance at retrieval, which operated in addition to the
episodic memory itself.
Experiment 1
This experiment aimed to set a benchmark by maximizing age diﬀerences in memory
and by maximizing the potential for prior knowledge to aid memory.
The environmental support hypothesis highlights that age deﬁcits in memory are
greater when there is less support during retrieval and that they are the greatest during
free recall tasks where there are no environmental cues at all at retrieval (Craik, 1986).
We therefore presumed that prior knowledge would have the maximum chance of
reducing age deﬁcits in memory with a free recall design.
Another feature of this experiment was the use of English and Asian proverbs as
memory stimuli (prior knowledge present and absent, respectively). Other studies
manipulating prior knowledge have typically used common versus uncommon stimuli
but have not always maximized the diﬀerence between these conditions. For example,
Hess (1985) used actions that were typical or atypical but all of the actions were normal
enough to have been encountered in life before the experiment. Arbuckle et al. (1990)
tested memory for facts within passages of text about music or dogs (with music experts
and nonexperts), but it is not clear whether the participants who were music experts
knew the information in one type of passage but not in the other. Our manipulation of
prior knowledge was designed to maximize the contrast between known and unknown
stimuli. Additionally, we assessed prior knowledge of each proverb after the memory
test had taken place.
Method
Design
There were two factors: age (young vs. older adults; between participants) and prior
knowledge (present vs. absent; within participants).
Participants
Thirty-nine young and 36 older adults took part in the experiment (this excludes one
young and two older adults who failed to follow the instructions). Young participants
were recruited from the University of Warwick and received either £6 or course credit.
Older participants were all living independently and were recruited from an age study
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volunteer panel populated by local advertisements; they each received £10 toward their
travel expenses. All participants were native English speakers.
Background information is summarized in Table 1, where it can be seen that young
and older participants did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly in their years of education, t < 1. To
assess cognitive functioning, participants completed the Digit Symbol Substitution test
from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale–Revised (Wechsler, 1981) as a measure of
processing speed, and the multiple choice part of the Mill Hill vocabulary test (Raven,
Raven, & Court, 1988) as a measure of crystallized intelligence. The results were
consistent with the literature (e.g., Salthouse, 2010) in showing lower speed but higher
vocabulary in older than in young adults, t(73) = −7.27 and 9.15, respectively.
Materials
The study items were 60 English proverbs and 60 Asian proverbs that were translated
into English (see Table 2 for examples). These were all were taken from Poppenk, Kohler,
and Moscovitch (2010) who had previously found superior memory for the pre-experi-
mentally familiar English proverbs compared with the novel Asian proverbs. Participants
studied 10 English and 10 Asian proverbs for later recall; these were selected randomly
for each participant from the full set of materials.
Procedure
Participants completed ﬁve short study-test blocks. In each block, two English and
two Asian proverbs were studied for a later free recall test. Proverbs were displayed
sequentially at a rate of 7 s per proverb and the order of proverbs was random.
Between study and test there was a 20-s delay period where participants responded
true/false via a button press as to the correctness of various simple equations (e.g.,
4 + 2 = 6; true). At test, participants were instructed to say out loud anything they
could remember from the study set in any order they wished. Responses were
recorded on a digital Dictaphone for later scoring. The whole study-test procedure
was repeated ﬁve times, each with a new set of proverbs. In addition, there was a
two-proverb practice block at the beginning of the session in order to familiarize
participants with the procedure.
After the memory tests were completed, participants were shown all of the proverbs
again individually and were asked “Were you familiar with this proverb before the
experiment?” to which they responded with keys “J” (yes) and “F” (no).
Results and discussion
A proverb was scored as accurately recalled if the main gist of the proverb was
recalled as well as the majority of words from that proverb (across the whole
experiment, in only four cases was the gist recalled without also recalling the
majority of words). Performance for each participant was conservatively based
only on those English proverbs that he/she reported as knowing prior to the
experiment (i.e., high prior knowledge), and those Asian proverbs that he/she
reported as not knowing previously (no prior knowledge).1 Data were combined
across the ﬁve study-test blocks. Throughout the article, standard null hypothesis
tests are accompanied by an estimated Bayes Factor obtained through JASP
342 S. P. BADHAM ET AL.
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computer software (Love et al., 2015). The Bayes Factor (BF10) provides an odds
ratio for the alternative/null hypotheses (values <1 favor the null hypothesis and
values >1 favor the alternative hypothesis). For example, a BF10 of 0.40 would
indicate that the null hypothesis is 2.5 times more likely than the alternative
hypothesis (see Jarosz & Wiley, 2014).
A 2 (age: young, older) × 2 (prior knowledge: present, absent) repeated-measures
ANOVA was conducted on the proportions of proverbs accurately recalled (see Figure 1
for means). Young adults recalled more than did older adults, F(1, 73) = 56.05,
MSE = 0.04, p < .001, ƞp2 = .43, BF10 = 3.19 × 107. There was a main eﬀect of prior
knowledge, F(1, 73) = 83.01, MSE = 0.03, p < .001, ƞp2 = .53, BF10 = 9.23 × 1012, with
known English proverbs being remembered better than unknown Asian proverbs. Thus
the manipulation of prior knowledge was successful. Crucially, there was no interaction
between age and prior knowledge (F < 1, BF10 = 0.99). To conﬁrm that the study had
suﬃcient statistical power, power analysis using G*power software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang,
& Buchner, 2007) was used to determine how many participants would be required to
Table 2. Examples of stimuli in study and test phases of Experiments 1–4.
Experiment Study Test
1 English and Asian proverbs Free recall
Don’t put all your eggs in one basket
Two wrongs don’t make a right
Talk does not cook rice
A tree grown in the wind has strong roots
2 Sentences describing scenes Recognition (old/new) of sentences/pictures
High knowledge condition
A man sitting on a bench A man sitting on a bench (old)
Some toothbrushes by a sink Some toothbrushes by a sink (old)
A man sitting on a wall (new)
Some toothbrushes in a travel bag (new)
Low knowledge condition
A cat in a tree A cat in a tree (old)
Sand on a building site Sand on a building site (old)
A bird in a tree (new)
Sand on a beach (new)
3 Professional–action pairs* Recognition (old/new)
The lawyer defended the client in court The lawyer defended the client in court (old)
The painter washed all of the brushes The painter washed all of the brushes (old)
The doctor made a sandwich for lunch The doctor made a sandwich for lunch (old)
The musician drove to the petrol station The musician drove to the petrol station (old)
The lawyer washed all of the brushes (new)
The painter defended the client in court (new)
The doctor drove to the petrol station (new)
The musician made a sandwich for lunch (new)
4 Word pairs Cued recall
Unique relations
spear–pistol, horn–trombone, dog–horse. . . spear-? horn-? dog-?. . .
Shared relations
banker–ﬁreman, engineer–cook, athlete–teacher. . .
cherry–pear, orange–apple, plum–lemon. . .
banker-? engineer-? athlete-?. . . cherry-?
orange-? plum-?. . .
No relations
whiskey–jacket, hawk–volcano, sycamore–tent. . . whiskey-? hawk-? sycamore-?. . .
Notes: Stimulus order randomized at study (Experiments 1–4) and at test (Experiments 2–4).
*Knowledge-consistent pairs in normal type; knowledge-neutral pairs in italics.
344 S. P. BADHAM ET AL.
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achieve a power of .8 to detect a medium eﬀect size (as deﬁned by Murphy & Myors,
1998). To detect a two-way interaction (with one between-participants factor and one
within-participants factor) would require 28 young and 28 older participants (i.e., fewer
than were tested).
The proverbs in the current study were multicomponential as they contained
several words in each memory item. Therefore, the lack of an age by knowledge
interaction is partially consistent with the studies presented in the introduction. Of
the studies showing age invariance in the eﬀect of prior knowledge on memory, all
were based on multicomponent stimuli (e.g., recall for passages of text, Arbuckle
et al., 1990; positions of multiple items, Cherry & Jones, 1999). However, some
studies showing greater knowledge eﬀects on older adults’ memory relative to
young adults’ memory also involved multicomponent information (Garcia-Bajos
et al., 2012; Hess, 1985).
Prior knowledge aided memory eﬀectively, but equally so for the two age
groups. This indicates that our lack of age variance in prior knowledge use was
not due to (1) weak contrast between high and low prior knowledge conditions
(which was maximal) or (2) small age-related deﬁcits in memory, which were large
(ƞp2 = .43) due to the free recall design. It has been suggested that prior knowl-
edge eﬀects operate at retrieval (Alba & Hasher, 1983). Therefore, in Experiment 2,
we continued to investigate environmental support by manipulating the amount of
support available at retrieval, a factor that was crossed with a prior knowledge
manipulation. This should help establish whether prior knowledge can provide
support beyond that of eﬀective environmental cues.
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Figure 1. Proportion of proverbs recalled by young and older adults for known (English) and
unknown (Asian) proverbs in Experiment 1. Error bars are ±1 SE.
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Experiment 2
In this experiment, encoding speciﬁcity was manipulated by altering the nature of
cues provided during retrieval. In line with the encoding speciﬁcity hypothesis
(Tulving & Thompson, 1973), it was expected that encouraging similar processing
at encoding and retrieval would lead to better memory performance. In a novel
paradigm, participants studied sentences describing simple scenes and their
memory was tested either with the original sentences (high encoding speciﬁcity/
environmental support) or with pictures of the scenes (low encoding speciﬁcity/
environmental support). Prior knowledge was used to further inﬂuence the match
between the sentence and the expected image. For example, for the sentence “A
man sitting on a bench”, the image is supported by prior experience and is
relatively easy to visualize as there is only one way to sit on a bench and benches
are generally quite similar. However, for the sentence “A man sitting on a wall”, the
image is much more novel because the man could be sitting across the wall, or
leaning against it and the wall could be high or low, etcetera. Therefore, as
opposed to Experiment 1 where prior knowledge was either present or absent,
here, prior knowledge was either high or low.
Prior research has shown that older adults favor gist-based processing, preferring
to remember information in terms of its general meaning as opposed to its surface
form (Craik & Simon, 1980; Reder, Wible, & Martin, 1986). This has been hypothesized
to limit the speciﬁcity of their memory traces, and has been used to explain data
showing reduced encoding speciﬁcity eﬀects in older adults compared to young
adults (Puglisi, Park, Smith, & Dudley, 1988; Rabinowitz, Craik, & Ackerman, 1982).
Experiment 2 aimed to manipulate encoding speciﬁcity eﬀects by using stimuli that
were common or uncommon. Imagery evoked by sentences describing common
scenes was expected to match pictures of those scenes more naturally and speciﬁ-
cally than sentences and pictures of uncommon scenes. This may therefore reduce
the requirement for participants to encode speciﬁc memory traces and commensu-
rately may alleviate age-related memory deﬁcits that result from gist-based
processing.
Method
Design
There were three factors: age (young vs. older; between participants), prior knowledge
(high vs. low; within participants), and encoding speciﬁcity (high vs. low; within
participants).
Participants
Thirty young and 31 older adults took part in the experiment (see Table 1). Young
participants were students recruited from the University of Warwick, and independently
living older participants were recruited from the local community. Participants were
oﬀered no ﬁnancial incentives for volunteering. Young participants had completed more
years of education and produced higher speed scores and lower vocabulary scores than
older participants, t(33.7) = 2.53, t(59) = 11.02, and t(59) = −4.50, respectively.
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Materials
Images were found from the internet and sentences were generated for 30 diﬀerent
pairs of scenes (see Table 2 for example study and test sentences). Within each pair, one
was a high prior knowledge scene (something encountered regularly in life or on
television; e.g., “Some toothbrushes by a sink”, “A man sitting on a bench”) and the
other was a low prior knowledge scene (something encountered less regularly in life or
on television; e.g., “Some toothbrushes in a travel bag”, “A man sitting on a wall”). An
image was found for each scene and a sentence describing each image was generated.
This produced 30 sets of four stimuli, with two images and two sentences.
Stimuli validation
Initially, the matched high and low knowledge consistency pairs of stimuli were
assessed to establish which would be encountered more often by people. Six
independent participants aged 18–50 years (M = 26.5, SD = 12.2) were presented
with the matched pairs of images or pairs of sentences on a sheet of paper and were
asked to indicate which item of each pair they see more often in everyday life
(including on the television). Each participant saw half of the pairs as images and
half of the pairs as sentences. Participants were shown 30 pairs in total and the stimuli
chosen for the experiment were those from stimulus sets where at least ﬁve out of six
participants chose the high prior knowledge scene as more often encountered than
the low prior knowledge scene. Twenty-three out of 30 sets met this criterion and 22
were used in the experiment.
In addition, to check that the sentences matched the images, the six participants
were given 20 images and 20 sentences to match up. This was repeated three times so
that all 60 stimuli (30 high and 30 low knowledge consistency) image-sentence matches
were assessed. All six participants scored perfectly on this task, indicating that the
images were appropriately described in the sentences.
Procedure
The experiment involved encoding sentences and recognizing either sentences (high
encoding speciﬁcity) or pictures (low encoding speciﬁcity). Two separate memory tasks
were completed, one with high prior knowledge stimuli at study and one with low prior
knowledge stimuli at study, with the order of these blocks counterbalanced across
participants.
For an individual block, participants studied 10 sentences sequentially for 5 s each,
with a 500-ms interstimulus interval. For each participant, the 22 sets of stimuli were
randomly allocated such that 10 were assigned to the high prior knowledge block, 10 to
the low prior knowledge block, and two were used for practice. Of the 10 displayed
sentences per block, ﬁve were randomly chosen to be tested as sentences and ﬁve were
randomly chosen to be tested as pictures.
Between study and test there was a 30-s delay period where participants responded
true/false via a button press as to the correctness of various simple math equations.
For the recognition tests, there were 20 trials with 10 old and 10 new stimuli. The new
stimuli were taken from the opposite scene within each stimulus set. For example, if the
participant studied “Some toothbrushes by a sink”, then the lure would be “Some
toothbrushes in a travel bag” (or the corresponding image). Targets and lures for a
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given study sentence were always presented in the same format (i.e., both presented as
sentences during recognition or both presented as images during recognition). Images
were presented in the center of the 1024 × 768 pixel display within a frame of 512 × 384
pixels. The order of recognition trials was entirely random with targets/lures and
sentences/images intermixed; stimuli were presented until response, followed by a
500-ms interstimulus interval. The recognition test required participants to press “J”
for old/seen-before or “F” for new/not-seen-before with the index ﬁngers of each hand.
They were encouraged to respond accurately.
Participants initially completed a practice task in the same format but with just two
study sentences and four recognition trials (with materials not used in the main test).
After practice, participants completed the two experimental blocks, with a rest period
between them.
Results and discussion
The proportions of hits (the proportion of correct endorsements of old stimuli in the
recognition test) and false alarms (the proportion of incorrect endorsements of new
stimuli in the recognition test) are presented in Appendix 1. We used the standard
corrected recognition measure of performance, scored as the proportion of hits minus
the proportion of false alarms.
A 2 (age: young, older) × 2 (prior knowledge: high, low) × 2 (encoding speciﬁcity: high,
low) repeated-measures ANOVA2 was conducted on the hits minus false alarms data (see
Figure 2 for means). Young adults performed better than older adults, F(1, 59) = 6.72,
MSE = 0.18, p < .05, ƞp2 = .10, BF10 = 1.66. High prior knowledge stimuli were recognized
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Figure 2. Recognition memory performance (hits minus false alarms) for young and older adults,
high and low knowledge consistency stimuli, and high and low encoding speciﬁcity recognition
trials in Experiment 2. Error bars are ±1 SE.
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better than low prior knowledge stimuli, F(1, 59) = 31.97, MSE = 0.08, p < .001, ƞp2 = .35,
BF10 = 3.50 × 10
4. There was also a main eﬀect of encoding speciﬁcity, F(1, 59) = 19.63,
MSE = 0.09, p < .001, ƞp2 = .25, BF10 = 1103, with better memory performance for high than
for low encoding speciﬁcity recognition trials (i.e., for sentences rather than pictures).
None of the interactions was signiﬁcant (Fs < 1; Age × Prior knowledge, BF10 = 0.35; Age ×
Encoding speciﬁcity, BF10 = 0.32; Age × Prior knowledge × Encoding speciﬁcity,
BF10 = 0.02; Prior knowledge × Encoding speciﬁcity, BF10 = 0.43).
Park, Puglisi, Smith, and Dudley (1987) found a congruent result to the current
data with young and older adults beneﬁting similarly from visual cues present at
encoding and retrieval to increase encoding speciﬁcity. However, surprisingly, prior
knowledge did not interact with encoding speciﬁcity in the current study despite the
strength of both main eﬀects. This indicates that high prior knowledge support did
not selectively beneﬁt the low encoding speciﬁcity condition compared with the
high encoding speciﬁcity condition as hypothesized. However, it is still likely that
knowledge did help memory by increasing encoding speciﬁcity. Visualization can
play a large part in memory for verbal material – for example, concrete nouns are
easier to remember than abstract nouns (see Paivio, 1991), and mnemonic techni-
ques such as the method of loci and the pegword system are based upon improving
memory via visualization techniques (Eysenck, 2009). Given that participants were
aware that their memory could later be tested visually and that the study sentences
were designed to describe a visual scene, it is highly likely that participants encoded
them visually and used these visual representations during retrieval. The verbal to
visual translation was by design more speciﬁc for the high prior knowledge support
stimuli. For example, visualizing a man sitting on a bench will be more speciﬁc than
visualizing a man sitting on a wall because the details of the bench and how a man
might sit on it are more speciﬁc than for how a man might sit on a wall.
Crucially, there was absolutely no hint of an age by prior knowledge interaction, or a
three-way interaction. Power analysis was conducted as described in Experiment 1. With
one between-participants factor and two within-participants factors, the study would
require 28 young and 28 older participants to detect an interaction of medium eﬀect
size with a power of .8 (again fewer than were tested). These data therefore show that
young and older adults make similar use of prior knowledge to encode and retrieve
visual descriptions of scenes. The data also suggest that knowledge may facilitate verbal
to visual translations of stimuli during encoding and retrieval, again to the same extent
in both young and older adults.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 continued to focus on how prior knowledge might inﬂuence the amount
of environmental support available at retrieval, using similar stimuli to Experiment 2,
but remaining in the verbal domain. Here we developed a recognition memory test
where prior knowledge facilitated the identiﬁcation of hits and the rejection of lures. In
old–new recognition tasks, older adults often show particular diﬃculties in rejecting
lures. For example, Reder et al. (1986) showed that after memorizing short stories,
older adults were more likely to endorse lure sentences than young adults when those
lures were plausible. Cohn, Emrich, and Moscovitch (2008) found that after studying
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word pairs, older adults performed similarly to young adults in correctly recognizing
intact pairs but older adults produced more false alarms than young adults when
rejecting rearranged pairs. Older adults have also been shown to be more conﬁdent
than young adults when incorrectly endorsing lures (e.g., McCabe, Roediger, McDaniel,
& Balota, 2009; Shing, Werkle-Bergner, Li, & Lindenberger, 2009).
Participants studied person–action sentences that were either consistent with prior
knowledge (e.g., “The teacher marked the mock exam papers”, “The pilot landed the
aeroplane safely”) or neutral in relation to prior knowledge (e.g., “The teacher caught the
train to London”, “The pilot bought a new winter coat”). When two consistent sentences
were rearranged to form recognition lures, they became inconsistent with prior knowl-
edge (e.g., “The teacher landed the aeroplane safely”), but when two neutral sentences
were rearranged to form recognition lures they remained neutral (e.g., “The teacher
bought a new winter coat”). This design created lures that were relatively easy to reject
in the high prior knowledge consistency condition, which was hypothesized to dispro-
portionately favor older adults who have a greater tendency than young adults to
endorse lures during recognition.
This type of stimulus is also used in studies of the fan eﬀect (Anderson, 1974) and fan
size was manipulated in the current experiment. We have summarized the fan eﬀect
data in Appendix 2 as it is not relevant to the current narrative (the fan eﬀect was
marginal and did not interact with age or prior knowledge factors). The data presented
here do not include the factor relevant to the fan eﬀect.
Method
Design
There were two factors: age (young vs. older; between participants) and prior knowledge
(consistent vs. neutral with respect to prior knowledge; within participants).
Participants
Twenty-nine young and 29 older adults took part in the experiment for no ﬁnancial
reward (this excludes one young adult who failed to follow the instructions and one
older adult whose data were corrupted during the experimental run). Young partici-
pants were recruited from the University of Warwick and from the local community,
and independently living older participants were recruited from the local community
(see Table 1 for details). Young and older participants did not diﬀer in their years of
education, t < 1, but again there were signiﬁcantly higher speed scores, t(56) = 7.50,
and lower vocabulary scores, t(56) = −6.25, for young compared with older adults.
Materials
Participants studied 16 sentences and then completed 32 old/new recognition trials.
This procedure was repeated ﬁve times in total with exactly the same stimuli in
randomized order, allowing participants to learn the sentences better upon each repeti-
tion. Sentences comprised a professional person followed by an action. Study and test
sentences were created from 24 actions that were linked to eight professional people
consistently with prior knowledge. A further 16 actions were neutral with respect to all
professionals (see Table 2 for examples).
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Each participant studied eight sentences where the professional and action were
consistent with prior knowledge and eight sentences where the professionals were
paired with neutral actions. Eight diﬀerent professionals were used with 16 diﬀerent
actions: four of the professionals were associated with three actions and four were
associated with just one action (providing a design suitable for assessing the fan eﬀect
– see Appendix 2). Within any given study list, each professional either appeared with
only knowledge-consistent actions or only knowledge-neutral actions.
For the recognition test, the original 16 sentences made up half of the trials for the
old/intact trials. The remaining 16 lure sentences were created using the same profes-
sionals and actions and these were rearranged to form new/recombined trials. The
sentences were rearranged within their prior knowledge consistency condition: profes-
sional–action pairings consistent with prior knowledge were recombined to form lures
inconsistent with prior knowledge (e.g., “The teacher landed the aeroplane safely”). In the
case of the neutral stimuli, rearranged professional–action pairings remained neutral.
This method of recombination ensured that lures were constructed from sentences of
the same prior knowledge condition so that they could be distinguished from each
other during analysis of recognition trials.
Professionals and actions were combined and recombined entirely randomly (in line
with the constraints outlined above) for each participant. All study trials and test trials
were presented in a randomized order and this order was randomized anew upon each
of the ﬁve study-test periods.
Procedure
During encoding, participants studied the sentences sequentially at a rate of 5 s per
sentence with a 500-ms interval between sentences. They were instructed to remember
which professionals were associated with which actions for a later recognition test.
Participants were then immediately asked via an on-screen prompt to “Press the space
bar to begin the memory test”. They were required to press the “J” key for old/seen-
before sentences and the “F” key for new/recombined sentences with the index ﬁngers
of each hand and they were instructed to respond as accurately and as quickly as
possible. At the end of each study-test period, participants were instructed to “Press
space to repeat [the] study list”. Stimuli were presented in a white font on a black
background with a letter height corresponding to approximately 1° viewing angle.
Results and discussion
Recognition accuracy was calculated as hit rates minus false alarm rates across all ﬁve
test runs combined (Appendix 1 shows hits and false alarms separately; Appendix 2
shows the same analysis with test run and fan eﬀect entered as factors). A 2 (age: young,
older) × 2 (prior knowledge: consistent, neutral) repeated-measures ANOVA was con-
ducted on accuracy (see Figure 3 for means). Young adults performed better than older
adults, F(1, 56) = 17.06, MSE = 0.09, p < .001, ƞp2 = .23, BF10 = 547. Memory was better for
knowledge-consistent phrases than for knowledge-neutral phrases, F(1, 56) = 93.34,
MSE = 0.28, p < .001, ƞp2 = .63, BF10 = 7.92 × 1010, indicating that knowledge was
supporting memory. Crucially, in contrast to Experiments 1 and 2, there was an age by
knowledge consistency interaction, F(1, 56) = 6.28, MSE = 0.03, p < .05, ƞp2 = .10,
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BF10 = 13.0, with older adults showing a greater beneﬁt from prior knowledge use
relative to young adults (Appendix 2 also shows the same interaction for the ﬁrst test
run only to ensure that the result is not due to ceiling eﬀects in young adults).3
Why was the age by knowledge interaction signiﬁcant here but not for Experiments 1
and 2? Experiments 1 and 2 used a prior knowledge manipulation that was based on
frequency of occurrence. In Experiment 2, the diﬀerence between high and low prior
knowledge stimuli (e.g., “A man sitting on a bench” and “A man sitting on a wall”,
respectively) was that the former had been encountered more frequently in everyday
life. The same can be said of Experiment 1, although the contrast was greater in that
prior knowledge was either present or absent. Experiment 3 diﬀered because it used
prior knowledge to construct logical or illogical stimuli (e.g., “The teacher marked the
mock exam papers” or “The teacher landed the aeroplane safely”, respectively). Thus
prior knowledge supported memory along a separate dimension, providing an extra
criterion upon which to accept and reject recognition test stimuli that was independent
of the memory trace itself. This hypothesis is tested below.
Experiment 4
It can be seen in the literature that many of the memory tests where prior knowledge
disproportionately beneﬁted older adults involved knowledge that was uniquely applic-
able to each memory that was tested (Badham et al., 2012; Naveh-Benjamin et al., 2003).
For example, in Badham et al.’s prior knowledge condition, participants memorized
associations between words that were related – participants studied 15 word pairs
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Figure 3. Mean recognition performance (hits minus false alarms) for stimuli consistent or neutral
with respect to prior knowledge in Experiment 3. Error bars are ±1 SE.
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that were related in diﬀerent ways (e.g., motorcycle–car = modes of transport, fox–
dog = animals, etc. in the same memory list). In these studies, prior knowledge provided
extra cueing information that could be used during retrieval, namely relations based on
prior knowledge: for example, if a participant was provided with the cue “motorcycle” at
test, they knew that the target was (1) shown with that cue earlier, and (2) related to
that cue.
In contrast, many of the studies that showed similar knowledge eﬀects on memory
with young and older adults used conditions that drew upon the degree of exposure to
prior knowledge (e.g., music experience, Arbuckle et al., 1990; and cooking experience,
Miller, 2003). Here, knowledge helped memory by linking stimuli to wider experience
(possibly by encouraging deeper processing, cf. Craik & Lockhart, 1972), but it did not
provide extra information, beyond that stored in the memory traces themselves, that
could be used to distinguish between memories in the face of interference.
In this ﬁnal experiment, we manipulated whether or not prior knowledge could be
used as an additional cue to guide retrieval. Using a cued recall paradigm similar to
Badham et al. (2012), we tested participants’ memory for related and unrelated word
pairs. Crucially, two conditions were created with related pairs: unique relations
(where every one of 16 word pairs within a list was related in a diﬀerent way) and
shared relations (where multiple word pairs within a list were related in the same
way, e.g., eight pairs of transport words plus eight pairs of animal words). In this
latter condition, relations were present but provided no additional information to
narrow down retrieval options. For example, after studying eight pairs of transport
words, remembering that a target word was related to a cue “motorcycle” would not
aid in distinguishing it from the seven other transport-based target words. It was
hypothesized that older adults would disproportionately beneﬁt from unique
relations but not from shared relations.
Method
Design
There were two factors: age (young vs. older; between participants) and word relations
(unique relations, shared relations, no relations; within participants).
Participants
Thirty-six young and 36 older adults took part in the experiment (see Table 1).
Young participants were students recruited from the University of Warwick; older
adults were all living independently and were recruited from an age study
volunteer panel populated by local advertisements. Participants were compensated
£6 for volunteering. Young and older adults had completed similar years of
education, t < 1. Young participants produced higher speed scores and lower
vocabulary scores than older participants, t(64.5) = 9.46, t(70) = −5.44, respectively.
Materials
Groups of words were taken from Van Overschelde, Rawson, and Dunlosky (2004), where
participants were required to list as many items as they could that ﬁtted into various
categories (e.g., a ﬁsh, a unit of distance). Categories that contained items from a variety
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of contexts were excluded (e.g., a thing made of wood, a thing taken from a burning
home). Also categories containing proper nouns were excluded (e.g., a country, a football
team name). From their study, 35 categories were used (see Table 3), each containing
between 7 and 16 items (where categories contained more than 16 items, the top 16
were taken).
Categories with 16 items were selected to form the “shared relations” condition.
This allowed eight pairs of related words to be formed where the relation was of
the same nature for all eight pairs (words within a category being paired together
randomly). Two 16-item/8-pair categories were used in this way to form a list of 16
word pairs. The two categories were chosen such that they did not have similar
items (e.g., a fruit and a vegetable would not be combined).
From the remaining categories, 16 diﬀerent categories were used to form the “unique
relations” condition. Two words from each category were randomly chosen to form 16
separate related-items word pairs. Again we ensured that no categories with similar
items appeared in the same list.
Finally, 32 categories were used to form the “no relations” condition. Sixteen word
pairs were formed with the constraints that no two words of a pair were from the same
Table 3. Categories used in Experiment 4.
Category
A bird
A carpenter’s tool
A chemical element
A ﬁsh
A four-footed animal
A fruit
A gardener’s tool
A kitchen utensil
A member of the clergy
A metal
A musical instrument
A natural earth formation
A nonalcoholic beverage
A part of a building
A part of the human body
A precious stone
A relative
A sport
A substance for ﬂavoring food
A transport vehicle
A tree
A type of fabric
A type of footwear
A type of human dwelling
A type of reading material
A unit of distance
A unit of time
A vegetable
A weapon
A weather phenomenon
An alcoholic beverage
An article of clothing
An article of furniture
An insect
An occupation or profession
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category and also that spurious relations between words within pairs were avoided
whenever possible (see Table 2 for example pairings).
Across all three lists, no items appeared twice for a given participant. Six versions of
the experiment were created for counterbalancing (six sets of three study lists).
Categories were selected at random in all six versions under the constraint that across
the six versions, no category was used more than once in the “shared relations”
condition. Across all the lists generated, alliteration and rhymes within pairs were
avoided and the mean number of letters per word was six for both the left and right
words of each pair. The English Lexicon Project (Balota et al., 2007) was used to assess
the frequency of use in language for the words in each condition based on log SUBTL
frequency (Brysbaert & New, 2009). The words in each condition occurred with similar
frequencies (F < 1; unrelated: M = 2.59, SD = 0.71; unique relations: M = 2.61, SD = 0.80;
shared relations: M = 2.51, SD = 0.70). The order of pair presentation within lists was
randomized for each participant every time the experiment was run.
Procedure
Participants were presented with the word pairs sequentially and were asked to
remember the associations between the words of each pair. They were informed
that they would later be shown the left word of each pair and would be asked to
verbally recall the word originally presented alongside it. In order to prevent ceiling
eﬀects in young adults and ﬂoor eﬀects in older adults, young and older participants
received the words at diﬀerent presentation rates (3 s and 6 s per pair, respectively)
as is typical in these types of cued recall memory tests (e.g., Naveh-Benjamin, 2000).
There was a 500-ms blank screen between each pair. Between study and test,
participants completed 30 s of true/false math questions as described in
Experiment 1. For cued recall, participants were shown the left word of each pair
and were asked to verbally report the word that it was originally paired with whilst
their voice was digitally recorded. Participants were given as long as they needed to
recall each word and the experimenter pressed a button once a response was made
to present the next cue word. There was a 500-ms interstimulus interval between
each word. The cue words were selected in a random order. Participants completed
the same study-test procedure three times, once with each type of relation condition.
They also completed a short practice test ﬁrst with two related and two unrelated
word pairs. The six possible orders of conditions were crossed with the six sets of
experimental stimuli to produce 36 versions of the experiment (one for each young
and older participant).
Results and discussion
A 2 (age: young, older) × 2 (word relations: unique, shared, none) repeated-measures
ANOVA was conducted on the proportion of correctly recalled words (see Figure 4 for
means).4 Young adults recalled more words than did older adults, F(1, 70) = 8.42,
MSE = 0.07, p < .001, ƞp2 = .11, BF10 = 59.8. There was a main eﬀect of word relations,
F(2, 140) = 249.88, MSE = 0.02, p < .001, ƞp2 = .78, BF10 > 1012, and this interacted with
age, F(2, 140) = 5.97, MSE = 0.02, p < .01, ƞp2 = .08, BF10 = 36.1. Planed 2 × 2 comparisons
revealed that older adults disproportionately beneﬁted from unique relations relative to
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no relations compared to young adults, F(1, 70) = 12.78, MSE = 0.02, p < .001, ƞp2 = .16,
BF10 = 102.3, replicating the existing literature (e.g., Badham et al., 2012; Naveh-Benjamin
et al., 2003). Crucially, with respect to the current hypothesis, older adults also dispro-
portionately beneﬁted from unique relations relative to shared relations compared to
young adults, F(1, 70) = 5.79, MSE = 0.02, p < .05, ƞp2 = .08, BF10 = 6.23. This demon-
strates that relations were only disproportionately helpful to older adults when use of
those relations pointed speciﬁcally to a target item in memory (i.e., when relations
provided an extra strategy by which to identify target words). Furthermore, an age by
word relation interaction was absent for the analysis comparing just the shared relation
and no relation pairs, F < 1, BF10 = 0.43 (words from the shared relations condition being
no better recalled than words from the no relations condition, F < 1.94, BF10 = 0.39),
indicating that relations were not disproportionately helpful to older adults if those
relations were not useful for guiding retrieval. The data therefore support our hypothesis
and suggest that relations are only disproportionately beneﬁcial to older adults relative
to young adults if they provide extra information to guide retrieval extrinsically to the
memory trace itself.
General discussion
In line with existing literature, all of the experiments reported showed that both young
and older adults could make use of prior knowledge to improve their memory
performance. In Experiment 1, participants memorized proverbs that they had either
experienced before or not. This maximized the use of prior knowledge by having it
either present or absent. Despite signiﬁcant age deﬁcits in memory and eﬀects of prior
knowledge, the two age groups utilized prior knowledge to the same extent. In
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Figure 4. Mean proportion correct for cued recall of word pairs with unique, shared, or no relations.
Error bars are ±1 SE.
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Experiment 2, old–new recognition memory for more-common scenes was superior to
memory for less-common scenes, again equally for young and older adults (and
increasing encoding speciﬁcity beneﬁted both age groups similarly).
Crucially, the series of experiments indicated a factor that could explain why
older adults sometimes beneﬁt more than young adults when prior knowledge can
be applied in memory tasks. Experiment 3 used a high prior knowledge condition
with an old/new recognition task where targets were logical and lures were illogical
with respect to prior knowledge (e.g., “The teacher marked the mock exam papers”,
“The teacher landed the aeroplane safely”, respectively). Here, prior knowledge
disproportionately beneﬁted older adults relative to young adults and we hypothe-
sized that prior knowledge operated as an additional cue in the memory task: The
concept “is the phrase consistent with my knowledge of the world?” could be used
in addition to memory to endorse targets and reject lures. This hypothesis was
tested in Experiment 4. Young and older participants studied pairs of words that
were related (e.g., ﬂood–rain) or unrelated (e.g., crow–sock) and had to later recall
the right word of each pair when given the left. Therefore, at test, prior knowledge
could be utilized by the concept “the target was related to the cue” in addition to
the memory trace. When this concept was useful, older adults disproportionately
beneﬁted from relations compared to no relations relative to young adults.
However, we constructed an additional condition where the concept “the target
was related to the cue” was useless because multiple words were related in the
same way (e.g., many weather-related word pairs: ﬂood–rain, snow–tornado,
typhoon–sleet, etc.). Here, the concept “the target was related to the cue” was
useless because many targets were related to the cue. In this condition, young and
older adults showed similar eﬀects of prior knowledge where it could not be used
in addition to memory.
The current study therefore suggests that prior knowledge is helpful to older adults in
memory tasks, but that it is particularly helpful when it can be used strategically to
access appropriate episodic memories. Studies show reduced strategic processing in
older adults during memory tasks (Craik & Byrd, 1982; Dunlosky & Hertzog, 2001) and
that age-related memory deﬁcits are alleviated when strategic processing is encour-
aged/facilitated (Glisky, Rubin, & Davidson, 2001; Naveh-Benjamin, Brav, & Levy, 2007). It
is therefore evident that prior knowledge may help memory in two dissociable ways: (1)
by enhancing the encoding/storage/retrieval of the episodic memory itself, which is an
age-invariant process; and (2) by providing extra strategic support (akin to environmen-
tal support, Craik, 1986), in addition to the episode itself, which is disproportionately
beneﬁcial to older adults relative to young adults.
The current hypothesis can be used to evaluate the contrasting studies in the
introduction where there was both age variance and invariance in the use of prior
knowledge in memory tasks. First, for studies showing greater prior knowledge
eﬀects in older adults compared to young: Smith et al. (1998), Naveh-Benjamin
et al. (2003), and Badham et al. (2012) tested associative memory, with prior
knowledge providing unique relations between each pair similar to the unique
relations condition of the current Experiment 4. Therefore the concept “the items
were related” facilitated memory independently of the episodic memory itself. Castel
(2005) tested memory for item–price associations that were either realistic or
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unrealistic – therefore the concept “the price could be plausible” facilitated memory
for the realistic prices in addition to the episodic memories. Hess (1985) and
Garcia-Bajos et al. (2012) tested young and older adults’ memory for typical and
atypical actions performed by characters in events. Therefore the concept “what
would someone normally do in this situation?” facilitated memory for typical actions
independently of the memory trace itself.
For the studies showing similar eﬀects of prior knowledge for young and older
adults, Arbuckle et al. (1990) and Miller (2003) tested young and older experts on
information related or not related to their domain of expertise (music and cooking).
Here, prior knowledge (expertise) was only useful for enriching memory and the
two age groups beneﬁted similarly. The prior knowledge concept “it was related to
my music expertise” would not facilitate memory for a whole passage about music.
This is similar to the shared relations condition of the current Experiment 4 (where
participants studied, for instance, a whole set of word pairs related to weather
phenomena). Morrow et al. (1998) assessed memory for appointments in young and
older adults where the information was presented in an ordered (knowledge-con-
sistent) or disordered (knowledge-inconsistent) sequence. The concept “the
information was ordered logically” would not provide an additional cue to access
the information itself. Similarly, Cherry and Jones (1999) tested young and older
adults’ memory for spatial locations of furniture that was either organized or
unorganized (e.g., all the kitchen furniture together or all the kitchen furniture
dispersed randomly). The concept “all the kitchen furniture was together” would
not necessarily facilitate memory for the spatial positions of individual items.
Although it could be argued that furniture being organized into realistic positions
would provide an external cue via the concept “the furniture should be logically
arranged”, at least one other study has found greater organizational beneﬁts with
furniture positions for older adults compared to young adults (Hess & Slaughter,
1990), but note that there are many ways to arrange furniture so logic may not
always be helpful. Finally, Gutchess and Park (2009) marks an exception to our
hypothesis: groups of young and older participants looked at a series of images
with a central picture (e.g., a cow) presented in front of a regular (e.g., farm) or
irregular (e.g., laundry room) background. We would predict that the concept “the
picture ﬁts with the background” would particularly help older adults retrieve
regular picture–background associations. This design is similar to the uniquely
related word pairs in our Experiment 4, but Gutchess and Park found that young
and older adults beneﬁted from regularity to the same extent. However, there were
few eﬀects of relatedness across the three experiments in Gutchess and Park (2009),
which might have limited their chance of ﬁnding an age by relatedness interaction.
One methodical issue that deserves some consideration here is the inﬂuence of
scaling eﬀects, whereby overall diﬀerences in performance between young and older
adults may lead to the presence of spurious interactions, or indeed the absence of real
interactions (Salthouse, 2000). Throughout the article we have been careful to avoid
ceiling eﬀects in young adults’ memory and ﬂoor eﬀects in older adults’ memory that
can drive interactions. Other research such as Naveh-Benjamin et al. (2003) has also
shown that prior knowledge can disproportionately beneﬁt older adults compared to
both a full attention young group, who performed better than the older adults, and a
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divided attention (at encoding) young group, who performed equivalently to older
adults overall. Additionally, the main eﬀect of age varied in magnitude between
Experiments 3 and 4 (ƞp2 = .23 and ƞp2 = .11, respectively), both of which showed age
by prior knowledge interactions, and between Experiments 1 and 2 (ƞp2 = .43 and
ƞp2 = .10, respectively), both of which showed no age by prior knowledge interactions.
This demonstrates that a variety of overall age diﬀerences can yield both the presence
and absence of age diﬀerences in the use of prior knowledge. Thus we observed no
consistent inﬂuence of scaling eﬀects on age diﬀerences in the use of prior knowledge
in the current data.
To summarize, these results and much of the existing literature support our
hypothesis that prior knowledge eﬀects on memory can be dissociated into two
types. First, on an age-invariant basis, prior knowledge improves memory traces
themselves. A possible mechanism for this is the levels of processing framework
(Craik & Lockhart, 1972), where prior knowledge can be seen to encourage deeper
processing of stimuli, resulting in more eﬀective encoding. Arbuckle et al. (1990)
argued that prior knowledge may also aid in organizing and structuring concepts in
memory to produce more relevant chunks (cf. Miller, 1956). And many notions from
schema theory might be relevant to this eﬀect (Alba & Hasher, 1983). Second, prior
knowledge may act to support memory, independently of the memory trace itself.
This can be achieved by providing participants with information that can be used in
addition to memory, about the structure of a given memory task or memory stimuli.
For example, being aware that a target is semantically related (linked by prior
knowledge) to a cue can aid in accessing that target (Experiment 4), and this
awareness requires no access to the memory trace itself. This property of prior
knowledge is particularly beneﬁcial to older adults’ memory and we have demon-
strated here that it can alleviate age-related deﬁcits in associative memory.
Finally, there are other aspects to the use of prior knowledge that have not been
covered in the current article. Information incongruent with prior knowledge can be
diﬃcult to remember, often particularly so for older adults relative to young (see
Umanath & Marsh, 2014, for a review). Other complications arise when the linking of
experimental stimuli to prior knowledge is eﬀortful, which can cause reductions in
memory performance, particularly for older adults (Badham & Maylor, 2015). Overall,
there is much literature regarding the use of knowledge by older adults and it
remains an important issue to elucidate age variance in its access and application
in cognition.
Notes
1. Young adults reported knowing signiﬁcantly fewer English proverbs (out of 10) than did
older adults: Myoung = 8.6, SDyoung = 1.2; Molder = 9.7, SDolder = 0.6; t(58.90) = 5.07, p < .001.
However, young and older adults reported not knowing similar numbers of Asian proverbs
(out of 10): Myoung = 9.1, SDyoung = 1.3; Molder = 9.4, SDolder = 1.3; t(73) = 1.00, p = .32. The
pattern of results in the main ANOVA for Experiment 1 was identical when including all
English proverbs in the prior knowledge condition and all Asian proverbs in the no prior
knowledge condition.
2. Separate analysis conﬁrmed that there was no signiﬁcant inﬂuence of test order and no
interactions between test order and any of these factors.
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3. In addition, for response times to hits, there were highly signiﬁcant eﬀects of age, knowl-
edge consistency, and age × knowledge consistency, all p’s < .001, such that older adults
showed much greater speeding up from the correct recognition of knowledge-neutral
(2445 ms) to knowledge-consistent (1832 ms) phrases than did young adults (from 1351
to 1278 ms).
4. An initial three-way ANOVA showed no signiﬁcant main eﬀect of condition order and no
interactions involving condition order.
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Appendix 1.
Table A1. Means (and standard deviations) for hit and false alarm rates in young and older adults in
Experiments 2 and 3.
Young Older
Hits False alarms Hits False alarms
Experiment 2
High knowledge consistency – High encoding speciﬁcity .884 (.153) .045 (.123) .873 (.162) .180 (.219)
High knowledge consistency – Low encoding speciﬁcity .800 (.193) .135 (.189) .753 (.261) .233 (.204)
Low knowledge consistency – High encoding speciﬁcity .839 (.209) .206 (.203) .807 (.270) .313 (.296)
Low knowledge consistency – Low encoding speciﬁcity .723 (.229) .258 (.214) .700 (.286) .373 (.256)
Experiment 3
Knowledge-consistent .968 (.039) .041 (.041) .916 (.149) .135 (.226)
Knowledge-neutral .885 (.094) .177 (.173) .825 (.113) .416 (.214)
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Appendix 2.
Measurement of the fan eﬀect in Experiment 3
During encoding, participants were shown eight professionals associated with 16 actions (eight
actions for knowledge-consistent stimuli and eight actions for knowledge-inconsistent stimuli).
Some professionals were associated with three actions (providing a fan level of 1–3) and some
were associated with just one action (providing a fan level of 1–1). The fan eﬀect hypothesis states
that accuracy is poorer and response times slower when a single item is associated with multiple
other items. This is due to cue overload where items interfere with each other during retrieval as
multiple items are activated by a single cue. Older adults are more aﬀected by fan size than are
young adults, showing disproportionately more recognition errors for larger fan sizes compared to
smaller fan sizes (Gerard, Zacks, Hasher, & Radvansky, 1991; Radvansky, Zacks, & Hasher, 1996) and
disproportionately slower responses for larger fan sizes compared with smaller fan sizes (Cohen,
1990; Gerard et al., 1991).
A 2 (age: young, older) x 2 (knowledge consistency: consistent, neutral) x 2 (fan level: 1–1,
1–3) x 5 (test run: one to ﬁve) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on accuracy (hits
minus false alarms; see Figure A1 for means). Young adults performed better than older adults,
F(1, 56) = 14.92, MSE = 0.87, p < .001, ƞp2 = .21. There was a main eﬀect of knowledge
consistency, F(1, 56) = 85.24, MSE = 0.28, p < .001, ƞp2 = .60, with better memory for
knowledge-consistent phrases than for knowledge-neutral phrases. The eﬀect of fan level
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Figure A1. Mean recognition performance (hits minus false alarms) across ﬁve test runs for young
and older adults, knowledge-consistent and knowledge-neutral stimuli, and 1–1 and 1–3 fan levels
in Experiment 3.
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did not reach signiﬁcance, F(1, 56) = 2.30, MSE = 0.13, p = .14, ƞp2 = .04, although the means
were in the predicted direction of superior performance for fan level 1–1 than for fan level
1–3. There was also a main eﬀect of test run, F(3.22, 180.55) = 16.43, MSE = 0.10, p < .001,
ƞp2 = .23, with performance improving across test runs as participants learned the stimuli.
There was an age by knowledge consistency interaction, F(1, 56) = 7.41, MSE = 0.28, p < .01,
ƞp2 = .12, with older adults showing a greater beneﬁt from knowledge consistency relative to
young adults. There was also an interaction between test run and knowledge consistency, F
(3.33, 186.52) = 9.59, MSE = 0.08, p < .001, ƞp2 = .14, with performance for knowledge-neutral
sentences beneﬁting more across test runs than knowledge-consistent sentences. There were
no other interactions.
In addition, to address the possibility that the age x knowledge consistency interaction was
driven by ceiling eﬀects in young adults, the same repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on
the hit minus false alarm rates data for the ﬁrst test run only. The eﬀects were all as before,
importantly including the age by knowledge consistency interaction, F(1, 56) = 4.61, MSE = 0.15,
p < .05, ƞp2 = .08.
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